Fundamentals of designing complex aerospace software systems by Vassev, Emil & Hinchey, Mike
  
Chapter 4 
Fundamentals of Designing Complex  
Aerospace Software Systems  
Emil Vassev and Mike Hinchey1 
Abstract. Contemporary aerospace systems are complex conglomerates of 
components where control software drives rigid hardware to aid such systems 
meet their standards and safety requirements. The design and development of such 
systems is an inherently complex task where complex hardware and sophisticated 
software must exhibit adequate reliability and thus, they need to be carefully 
designed and thoroughly checked and tested. We discuss some of the best 
practices in designing complex aerospace systems. Ideally, these practices might 
be used to form a design strategy directing designers and developers in finding the 
“right design concept” that can be applied to design a reliable aerospace system 
meeting important safety requirements. Moreover, the design aspects of a new 
class of aerospace systems termed “autonomic” is briefly discussed as well.     
Keywords: software design, aerospace systems, complexity, autonomic systems. 
1   Introduction 
Nowadays, IT (information technology) is a key element in the aerospace 
industry, which relies on software to ensure both safety and efficiency. Aerospace 
software systems can be exceedingly complex, and consequently extremely 
difficult to develop. The purpose of aerospace system design is to produce a 
feasible and reliable aerospace that meets performance objectives. System 
complexity and stringent regulations drive the development process, where many 
factors and constraints need to be balanced to find the “right solution”. The design 
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of aerospace software systems is an inherently complex task due to the large 
number of components to be developed and integrated and the large number of 
design requirements, rigid constraints and parameters. Moreover, an aerospace 
design environment must be able to deal with highly risk-driven systems where 
risk and uncertainty are not that easy to capture or understand. All this makes an 
aerospace design environment quite unique.  
We rely on our experience to reveal some of the key fundamentals in designing 
complex aerospace software systems. We discuss best design practices that ideally 
form a design strategy that might direct designers in finding the “right design 
concept” that can be applied to design a reliable aerospace system meeting 
important safety requirements. We talk about design principles and the application 
of formal methods in the aerospace industry. Finally, we show the tremendous 
advantage of using a special class of space systems called autonomic systems, 
because the latter are capable of self-management, thus saving both money and 
resources for maintenance and increasing the reliability of the unmanned systems 
where human intervention is not feasible or impractical.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly present 
the complex nature of the contemporary aerospace systems. In Section 3, we 
present some of the best practices in designing such complex systems. In Section 
4, we introduce a few important design aspects of unmanned space systems and 
finally, Section 5 provides brief summary remarks.  
2   Complexity in Aerospace Software Systems 
The domain of aerospace systems covers a broad spectrum of computerized 
systems dedicated to the aerospace industry. Such systems might be onboard 
systems controlling contemporary aircraft and spacecraft or ground-control 
systems assisting the operation and performance of aerospace vehicles. Improving 
reliability and safety of aerospace systems is one of the main objectives of the 
whole aerospace industry. The development of aerospace systems from concept to 
validation is a complex, multidisciplinary activity. Ultimately, such systems 
should have no post-release faults and failures that may jeopardize the mission or 
cause loss of life. Contemporary aerospace systems integrate complex hardware 
and sophisticated software and to exhibit adequate reliability they need to be 
carefully designed and thoroughly checked and tested. Moreover, aerospace 
systems have strict dependability and real-time requirements, as well as a need for 
flexible resource reallocation and reduced size, weight and power consumption. 
Thus, system engineers must optimize their designs for three key factors: 
performance, reliability, and cost. As a result, the development process, 
characterized by numerous iterative design and analysis activities, is lengthy and 
costly. Moreover, for systems where certification is required prior to operation, the 
control software must go through rigorous verification and validation.  
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Contemporary aerospace systems are complex systems designed and 
implemented as multi-component systems where the components are self-contained 
and reusable, thus requiring high independency and complex synchronization. 
Moreover, the components of more sophisticated systems are considered as agents 
(multi-agent systems) incorporating some degree of intelligence. Note that 
intelligent agents [1] are considered one of the key concepts needed to realize self-
managing systems. The following elements outline the aspects of complexity in 
designing aerospace systems:    
• multi-component systems where inter-component interactions and 
system-level impact cannot always be modeled; 
• elements of artificial intelligence; 
• autonomous systems;  
• evolving systems; 
• high-risk and high-cost systems, often intended to perform missions 
with significant societal and scientific impacts; 
• rigid design constraints; 
• often extremely tight feasible design space; 
• highly risk-driven systems where risk and uncertainty cannot always 
be captured or understood. 
3   Design of Aerospace Systems – Best Practices 
In this section, we present some of the best practices that help us mitigate the 
complexity in designing aerospace systems. 
3.1   Verification-Driven Software Development Process 
In general for any software system to be developed, it is very important to choose 
the appropriate development lifecycle process to the project at hand because all 
other activities are derived from the process. An aerospace software development 
process must take into account the fact that aerospace systems need to meet a 
variety of standards and also have high safety requirements. To cope with these 
aspects, the development of aerospace systems emphasizes verification, 
validation, certification and testing. The software development process must be 
technically adequate and cost-effective for managing the design complexity and 
safety requirements of aerospace systems and for certifying their embedded 
software. For most modern aerospace software development projects, some kind 
of spiral-based methodology is used over a waterfall process, where the emphasis 
is on verification.  
As shown in Figure 1, NASA’s aerospace development process involves 
intensive verification, validation, and certification steps to produce sufficiently 
safe and reliable control systems. 
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Fig. 1 A common view of the NASA Software Development Process [2] 
3.2   Emphasis on Safety 
It is necessary to ensure that an adequate level of safety is properly specified, 
designed and implemented. Software safety can be expressed as a set of features 
and procedures, those ensuring that the system performs predictably under normal 
and abnormal conditions. Furthermore, “the likelihood of an unplanned event 
occurring is minimized and its consequences controlled and contained” [3].  
NASA uses two software safety standards [4]. These standards define four 
qualitative hazard severity levels: catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible. 
In addition, four qualitative hazard probability levels are defined: probable, 
occasional, remote, and improbable. Hazard severity and probability are correlated 
to derive the risk index (see Table 1). The risk index can be used to determine the 
priority for resolving certain risks first. 
Table 1 NASA Risk Index Determination [4] 
Hazard 
Severity
Hazard Probability
Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
Catastrophic 1 1 2 3
Critical 1 2 4 4
Marginal 2 3 4 5
Negligible 3 4 5 5
 
3.3   Formal Methods 
Formal methods are a means of providing a computer system development 
approach where both a formal notation and suitable mature tool support are 
provided. Whereas the formal notation is used to specify requirements or model a 
system design in a mathematical logic, the tool support helps to demonstrate that 
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the implemented system meets its specification. Even if a full proof is hard to 
achieve in practice due to engineering and cost limitations, it makes software and 
hardware systems more reliable. By using formal methods, we can reason about a 
system and perform a mathematical verification of that system’s specification; i.e., 
we can detect and isolate errors in the early stages of the software development.  
By using formal methods appropriately within the software development 
process of aerospace systems, developers gain the benefit of reducing overall 
development cost. In fact, costs tend to be increased early in the system lifecycle, 
but reduced later on at the coding, testing, and maintenance stages, where 
correction of errors is far more expensive. Due to their precise notation, formal 
methods help to capture requirements abstractly in a precise and unambiguous 
form and then, through a series of semantic steps, introduce design and 
implementation level detail. 
Formal methods have been recognized as an important technique to help ensure 
quality of aerospace systems, where system failures can easily cause safety 
hazards. For example, for the development of the control software for the C130J 
Hercules II, Lockheed Martin applied a correctness-by-construction approach 
based on formal (SPARK) and semi-formal (Consortium Requirements 
Engineering) methods [5]. The results showed that this combination was sufficient 
to eliminate a large number of errors and brought Lockheed Martin significant 
dividends in terms of high quality and less costly software. Note that an important 
part of the success of this approach is due to the use of the appropriate formal 
language. The use of a light version of SPARK, where the complex and difficult-
to-understand parts of the Ada language had been removed, allowed for a higher 
level of abstraction, reducing the overall system complexity.   
So-called synchronous languages [6] are formal languages dedicated to the 
programming of reactive systems. Synchronous languages (e.g., Lustre) were 
successfully applied in the development of automatic control software for critical 
applications like the software for nuclear plants, Airbus airplanes and the fight 
control software for Rafale fighters [7].  
R2D2C (Requirements-to-Design-to-Code) [8] is a NASA approach to the 
engineering of complex computer systems where the need for correctness of the 
system, with respect to its requirements, is particularly high. This category 
includes NASA mission software, most of which exhibits both autonomous and 
autonomic properties. The approach embodies the main idea of requirements-
based programming [9] and offers not only an underlying formalism, but also full 
formal development from requirements capture through to automatic generation of 
provably correct code. Moreover, the approach can be adapted to generate 
instructions in formats other than conventional programming languages—for 
example, instructions for controlling a physical device, or rules embodying the 
knowledge contained in an expert system. In these contexts, NASA has applied 
the approach to the verification of the instructions and procedures to be generated 
by the Hubble Space Telescope Robotic Servicing Missions and in the validation 
of the rule base used in the ground control of the ACE spacecraft [10]. 
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3.4   Abstraction 
The software engineering community recognizes abstraction as one of the best 
means of emphasizing important system aspects, thus helping to drive out 
unnecessary complexity and to come up with better solutions. According to James 
Rumbaugh, abstraction presents a selective examination of certain system aspects 
with the goal of emphasizing those aspects considered important for some purpose 
and suppressing the unimportant ones [11]. Designers of aerospace systems, shall 
consider abstraction provided by formal methods. Usually, aerospace software 
projects start with understanding the basic concepts of operations and requirements 
gathering, which results into a set of informal requirements (see Figure 1).  
Once these requirements are documented, they can be formalized, e.g., with 
Lustre or R2D2C (see Section 3.3). The next step will be to describe the design in 
more detail. This is to specify how the desired software system is going to operate. 
Just as Java and C++ are high-level programming languages, in the sense that they 
are typed and structured, the formal languages dedicated to aerospace are 
structured and domain-specific and thus, they provide high-level structures to 
emphasize on the important properties of the system in question. 
3.5   Decomposition and Modularity 
In general, a complex aerospace system is a combination of distributed and 
heterogeneous components. Often, the task of modeling an aerospace system is 
about decomposition and modularity. Decomposition and modularity are well 
known concepts, which are the fundamentals of software engineering methods. 
Decomposition is an abstraction technique where we start with a high-level 
depiction of the system and create low-level abstractions of the latter, where 
features and functions fit together. Note that both high-level and low-level 
abstractions should be defined explicitly by the designer and that the low-level 
abstractions eventually result into components. This kind of modularity is based 
on explicitly-assigned functions to components, thus reducing the design effort 
and complexity. The design of complex systems always requires multiple 
decompositions. 
3.6   Separation of Concerns 
This Section describes a methodological approach to designing aerospace systems 
along the lines of the separation-of-concerns idea—one of the remarkable means 
of complexity reduction. This methodology strives to optimize the development 
process at its various stages and it has proven its efficiency in the hardware design 
and the software engineering of complex aerospace systems. As we have seen in 
Section 3.3, complex aerospace systems are composed of interacting components, 
where the separation-of-concerns methodology provides separate design 
“concerns” that (i) focus on complementary aspects of the component-based 
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system design, and (ii) have a systematic way of composing individual 
components into a larger system. Thus, a fundamental insight is that the design 
concerns can be divided into four groups: component behavior, inter-component 
interaction, component integration, and system-level interaction. This makes it 
possible to hierarchically design a system by defining different models for the 
behavior, interaction, and integration of the components.  
• component behavior: This is the core of system functionality, and is 
about the computation processes with the single components that 
provides the real added value to the overall system. 
• inter-component interaction: This concern might be divided into three 
subgroups: 
o communication: brings data to the computational components 
that require it, with the right quality of service, i.e., time, 
bandwidth, latency, accuracy, priority, etc.; 
o connection: this is the responsibility of system designers to 
specify which components should communicate with each other; 
o coordination: determines how the activities of all components in 
the system should work together. 
• component integration: Addresses the concept of efficient matching 
of the various design elements of an aerospace system into the most 
efficient way possible. Component integration is typically a series  
of multidisciplinary design optimization activities that involve 
component behavior and inter-component interaction concerns. To 
provide this capability, the design environment (and often the 
aerospace system itself) incorporates a mechanism that automates 
component retrieval, adaptation, and integration. Component 
integration may also require configuration (or re-configuration) which 
is about giving concrete values to the provided component-specific 
parameters, e.g., tuning control or estimation gains, determining 
communication channels and their inter-component interaction 
policies, providing hardware and software resources and taking care 
of their appropriate allocation, etc. 
• system-level interaction: For an aerospace system, the interaction 
between the system and its environment (including human users) 
becomes an integral part of the computing process. 
The clear distinction between the concerns allows for a much better perception 
and understanding of the system’s features and consequently the design of the 
same. Separating behavior from interaction is essential in reconciling the disparity 
between concerns, but it may lead aerospace system designers to make a wrong 
conclusion: intended component behaviors can be designed in isolation from their 
intended interaction models. 
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3.7   Requirements-Based Programming 
Requirements-Based Programming (RBP) has been advocated [9] as a viable 
means of developing complex, evolving systems. It embodies the idea that 
requirements can be systematically and mechanically transformed into executable 
code. Generating code directly from requirements would enable software 
development to better accommodate the ever increasing demands on systems. In 
addition to increased software development productivity through eliminating 
manual efforts in the coding phase of the software lifecycle, RBP can also increase 
the quality of generated systems by automatically performing verification on the 
software—if the transformation is based on the formal foundations of computing. 
This may seem to be an obvious goal in the engineering of aerospace software 
systems, but RBP does in fact go a step further than current development methods. 
System development typically assumes the existence of a model of reality (design 
or, more precisely, a design specification), from which an implementation will be 
derived.  
4   Designing Unmanned Space Systems 
Space poses numerous hazards and harsh conditions, which makes it a very hostile 
place for humans. Without risking human lives, robotic technology such as robotic 
missions, automatic probes and unmanned observatories allow for space 
exploration. Unmanned space exploration poses numerous technological 
challenges. This is basically due to the fact that unmanned missions are intended 
to explore places where no man has gone before and thus, such missions must 
deal, often autonomously and with no human control, with unknown factors, risks, 
events and uncertainties. 
4.1   Intelligent Agents 
Both autonomy and artificial intelligence lay the basis for unmanned space 
systems. So-called “intelligent agents” [12] provide for the ability of space 
systems to act without human intervention. An agent can be viewed as perceiving 
its environment through sensors and acting upon that environment through 
effectors (see Figure 2). Therefore, in addition to the requirements traditional  
for an aerospace system such as reliability and safety, when designing an agent-
based space system, we must also tackle issues related to agent-environment 
communication.  
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Fig. 2 Agent-Environment Relationship  
Therefore, to design efficiently, we must consider the operational environment, 
because it plays a crucial role in an agent’s behavior. There are a few important 
classes of environment that must be considered in order to properly design the 
agent-environment communication.  The agent environment can be:  
• fully observable (vs. partially observable) – the agent’s sensors sense 
the complete state of the environment at each point in time; 
• deterministic (vs. stochastic) – the next state of the environment is 
completely determined by the current state and the action executed by 
the agent;  
• episodic (vs. sequential) – the agent's experience is divided into 
atomic "episodes" (each episode consists of the agent perceiving and 
then performing a single action), and the choice of action in each 
episode depends only on the episode itself; 
• static (vs. dynamic) – the environment is unchanged while an agent is 
deliberating (the environment is semi-dynamic if it does not change 
with the passage of time but the agent's performance does); 
• discrete (vs. continuous) – an agent relies on a limited number of 
clearly defined distinct environment properties and actions; 
• single-agent (vs. multi-agent) – there is only one agent operating in 
the environment. 
As we have mentioned above, space systems are often regarded as multi-agent 
systems, where many intelligent agents interact with each other. These agents are 
considered to be autonomous entities that interact either cooperatively or non-
cooperatively (on a selfish base). A popular multi-agent system approach is the so-
called intelligent swarms. Conceptually, a swarm-based system consists of many 
simple entities (agents) that are independent but grouped as a whole appear to be 
highly organized. Without a centralized supervision, but due to simple local 
interactions and interactions with the environment, the swarm systems expose 
complex behavior emerging from the simple microscopic behavior of their 
members. 
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4.2   Autonomic Systems 
The aerospace industry is currently approaching autonomic computing (AC) 
recognizing in its paradigm a valuable approach to the development of single 
intelligent agents and whole spacecraft systems capable of self-management. In 
general, AC is considered a potential solution to the problem of increasing system 
complexity and costs of maintenance. AC proposes a multi-agent architectural 
approach to large-scale computing systems, where the agents are special 
autonomic elements (AEs) [13, 14]. The “Vision of Autonomic Computing” [14] 
defines AEs as components that manage their own behavior in accordance with 
policies, and interact with other AEs to provide or consume computational 
services.  
4.2.1   Self-management 
An autonomic system (AS) is designed around the idea of self-management, 
which traditionally results into designing four basic policies (objectives) - self-
configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing, and self-protecting (often termed as self-
CHOP policies). In addition, in order to achieve these self-managing objectives, 
an autonomic system (AS) must constitute the following features: 
• self-awareness – aware of its internal state; 
• self-situation – environment awareness, situation and context 
awareness; 
• self-monitoring – able to monitor its internal components; 
• self-adjusting – able to adapt to the changes that may occur. 
Both objectives (policies) and features (attributes) form generic properties 
applicable to any AS. Essentially, AS objectives could be considered as system 
requirements, while AS attributes could be considered as guidelines identifying 
basic implementation mechanisms.  
4.2.2   Autonomic Element 
An AS might be decomposed (see Section 3.5) into AEs (autonomic elements). In 
general, an AE extends programming elements (i.e., objects, components, 
services) to define a self-contained software unit (design module) with specified 
interfaces and explicit context dependencies. Essentially, an AE encapsulates 
rules, constraints and mechanisms for self-management, and can dynamically 
interact with other AEs. As stated in the IBM Blueprint [13], the core of the AEs 
is a special control loop. The latter is a set of functionally related units: monitor, 
analyzer, planner, and executor, all of them sharing knowledge (see Figure 3). A 
basic control loop is composed of a managed element (also called a managed 
resource) and a controller (called autonomic manager). The autonomic manager 
makes decisions and controls the managed resource based on measurements and 
events.  
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Fig. 3 AE Control Loop and Managed Resource  
4.2.3   Awareness      
Awareness is a concept playing a crucial role in ASs. Conceptually, awareness is a 
product of knowledge processing and monitoring. The AC paradigm addresses 
two kinds of awareness in ASs [13]: 
• self-awareness – a system (or a system component) has detailed 
knowledge about its own entities, current states, capacity and 
capabilities, physical connections and ownership relations with other 
(similar) systems in its environment; 
• context-awareness – a system (or a system component) knows how to 
negotiate, communicate and interact with environmental systems (or 
other components of a system) and how to anticipate environmental 
system states, situations and changes. 
4.2.4   Autonomic Systems Design Principles      
Although recognized as a valuable approach to unmanned spacecraft systems, the 
aerospace industry (NASA, ESA) does not currently employ any development 
approaches that facilitate the development of autonomic features. Instead, the 
development process of autonomic components and systems is identical to the one 
of traditional software systems (see Figure 1), thus causing inherent difficulties in: 
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• expressing autonomy requirements; 
• designing and implementing autonomic features; 
• efficiently testing autonomic behavior. 
For example, the experience of developing autonomic components for ESA’s 
ExoMars [15] has shown that the traditional development approaches do not cope 
well with the non-deterministic behavior of the autonomic elements – a proper 
testing requires a huge number of test cases. The following is a short overview of 
aspects and features that are needed to be addressed by an AS design.  
 
Self-* Requirements. Like any other contemporary computer systems, ASs also 
need to fulfill specific functional and non-functional requirements (e.g., safety 
requirements). However, unlike other systems, the development of an AS is driven 
by the self-management objectives and attributes (see Section 4.2.1) that must be 
implemented by that very system. Such properties introduce special requirements, 
which we term self-* requirements. Note that self-management requires 1) self-
diagnosis to analyze a problem situation and to determine a diagnosis, and 2) self-
adaptation to repair the discovered faults. The ability of a system to perform 
adequate self-diagnosis depends largely on the quality and quantity of its 
knowledge of its current state, i.e., on the system awareness (see Section 4.2.3). 
 
Knowledge. In general, an AS is intended to possess awareness capabilities based 
on well-structured knowledge and algorithms operating over the same. Therefore, 
knowledge representation is one of the important design activities of developing 
ASs. Knowledge helps ASs achieve awareness and autonomic behavior, where the 
more knowledgeable systems are, the closer we get to real intelligent systems. 
 
Adaptability. The core concept behind adaptability is the general ability to 
change a system’s observable behavior, structure, or realization. This requirement 
is amplified by self-adaptation (or automatic adaptation). Self-adaptation enables 
a system to decide on-the-fly about an adaptation on its own, in contrast to an 
ordinary adaptation, which is explicitly decided and triggered by the system’s 
environment (e.g., a user or administrator). Adaptation may result to changes in 
some functionality, algorithms or system parameters as well as the system’s 
structure or any other aspect of the system. If an adaptation leads to a change of 
the complete system model, including the model that actually decides on the 
adaptation, this system is called a totally reconfigurable system. Note that self-
adaptation requires a model of the system’s environment. (often referred to as 
context) and therefore, self-adaptation may be also called context adaptation.  
 
Monitoring. Since monitoring is often regarded as a prerequisite for awareness, it 
constitutes a subset of awareness. For ASs, monitoring (often referred to as self-
monitoring) is the process of obtaining knowledge through a collection of sensors 
instrumented within the AS in question. Note that monitoring is not responsible 
for diagnostic reasoning or adaptation tasks. One of the main challenges of 
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monitoring is to determine which information is most crucial for analysis of a 
system's behavior, and when. The notion of monitoring is closely related to the 
notion of context. Context embraces the system state, its environment, and any 
information relevant to the adaptation. Consequently, it is also a matter of 
context, which information indicates an erroneous system state and hence 
characterizes a situation in which a certain adaptation is necessary. In this case, 
adaptation can be compared to error handling, as it transfers the system from an 
erroneous (unwanted) system state to a well-defined (wanted) system state.  
 
Dynamicity. Dynamicity embraces the system ability to change at runtime. In 
contrast to adaptability this only constitutes the technical facility of change. While 
adaptability refers to the conceptual change of certain system aspects, which does 
not necessarily imply the change of components or services, dynamicity is about 
the technical ability to remove, add or exchange services and components. There 
is a close but not dependable relation between both dynamicity and adaptability. 
Dynamicity may also include a system ability to exchange certain (defective or 
obsolete) components without changing the observable behavior. Conceptually, 
dynamicity deals with concerns like preserving states during functionality change, 
starting, stopping and restarting system functions, etc. 
 
Autonomy. As the term Autonomic Computing already suggests, autonomy is one 
of the essential characteristics of ASs. AC aims at freeing human administrators 
from complex tasks, which typically requires a lot of decision making without 
human intervention (and thus without direct human interaction). Autonomy, 
however, is not only intelligent behavior but also an organizational manner. 
Context adaptation is not possible without a certain degree of autonomy. Here, the 
design and implementation of the AE control loop (see Section 4.2.2) is of vital 
importance for autonomy. A rule engine obeying a predefined set of conditional 
statements (e.g., if-then-else) put in an endless loop is the simplest form of control 
loop’s implementation. In many cases, such a simple- rule-based mechanism 
however may not be sufficient. In such cases, the control loop should facilitate 
force feedback learning and learning by observation to refine the decisions 
concerning the priority of services and their granted QoS, respectively. 
 
Robustness. Robustness is a requirement that is claimed for almost every system. 
ASs should benefit from robustness since this may facilitate the design of system 
parts that deal with self-healing and self-protecting. In addition, the system 
architecture could ease the appliance of measures in cases of errors and attacks. 
Robustness states the first and most obvious step on the road to dependable 
systems. Beside a special focus on error avoidance, several requirements aiming at 
correcting errors should also be forced. Robustness could be often achieved by 
decoupling and asynchronous communication, e.g., between interacting AEs 
(autonomic elements). Error avoidance, error prevention, and fault tolerance are 
approved techniques in software engineering, which shall help us in preventing 
from error propagation when designing ASs. 
78 E. Vassev and M. Hinchey
 
 
Mobility. Mobility enfolds all parts of the system: from mobility of code on the 
lowest granularity level via mobility of services or components up to mobility of 
devices or even mobility of the overall system. Mobility enables dynamic 
discovery and usage of new resources, recovery of crucial functionalities, etc. 
Often, mobile devices are used for detection and analysis of problems. For 
example, AEs may rely on mobility of code to transfer some functionality relevant 
for security updates or other self-management issues. 
 
Traceability. Traceability enables the unambiguous mapping of the logical onto 
the physical system architecture, thus facilitating both system implementation and 
deployment. The deployment of system updates is usually automatic and thus, it 
requires traceability. Traceability is additionally helpful when analyzing the 
reasons for wrong decisions made by the system. 
4.2.5   Formalism for Autonomic Systems   
ASs are special computer systems that emphasize self-management through 
context and self-awareness [13, 14]. Therefore, an AC formalism should not only 
provide a means of description of system behavior but also should tackle the 
issues vital for autonomic systems self-management and awareness. Moreover, an 
AC formalism should provide a well-defined semantics that makes the AC 
specifications a base from which developers may design, implement, and verify 
ASs (including autonomic aerospace components or systems). 
ASSL (Autonomic System Specification Language) [16] is a declarative 
specification language for ASs with well-defined semantics. It implements modern 
programming language concepts and constructs like inheritance, modularity, type 
system, and high abstract expressiveness. Being a formal language designed 
explicitly for specifying ASs, ASSL copes well with many of the AS aspects (see 
Section 4.2). Moreover, specifications written in ASSL present a view of the 
system under consideration, where specification and design are intertwined. 
Conceptually, ASSL is defined through formalization tiers [16]. Over these tiers, 
ASSL provides a multi-tier specification model that is designed to be scalable and 
exposes a judicious selection and configuration of infrastructure elements and 
mechanisms needed by an AS. ASSL defines ASs with special self-managing 
policies, interaction protocols, and autonomic elements. As a formal language, 
ASSL defines a neutral, implementation-independent representation for ASs. 
Similar to many formal notations, ASSL enriches the underlying logic with 
modern programming concepts and constructs thereby increasing the 
expressiveness of the formal language while retaining the precise semantics of the 
underlying logic.   
The authors of this paper have successfully used ASSL to design and 
implement autonomic features for part of NASA’s ANTS (Autonomous Nano-
Technology Swarm) concept mission [17].  
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5   Conclusions 
We have presented key fundamentals in designing complex aerospace software 
systems. By relying on our experience, we have discussed best design practices 
that can be used as guidelines by software engineers to build their own design 
strategy directing them towards the “right design concept” that can be applied to 
design a reliable aerospace system meeting the important safety requirements. 
Moreover, we have talked about design principles and the application of formal 
methods in the aerospace industry. Finally, we have shown the tremendous 
advantage of the so-called ASs (autonomic systems). ASs offer a solution for 
unmanned spacecraft systems, because the former are capable of self-adaptation, 
thus increasing the reliability of the unmanned systems where human intervention 
is not feasible or impractical. Although recognized as a valuable approach  
to unmanned spacecraft systems, the aerospace industry (NASA, ESA) does  
not currently employ any development approaches that facilitate the development 
of autonomic features. This makes both the implementation and testing of  
such features hardly feasible. We have given a short overview of aspects and 
features that are needed to be addressed by an AS design in order to make such a 
design efficient. To design and implement efficient ASs (including autonomic 
aerospace systems) we need AC-dedicated frameworks and tools. ASSL 
(Autonomic System Specification Language) is such a formal method, which we 
have successfully used at Lero—the Irish Software Engineering Research Centre, 
to develop autonomic features for a variety of systems, including NASA’s ANTS 
(Autonomous Nano-Technology Swarm) prospective mission. 
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